Shadow Banks Pose Major Threat to Financial Stability
04
Oct
T
he recent Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation  takes important steps toward stabilizing the financial sector, but it  may have created a false sense of security. There is a large and  worrisome vulnerability to bank runs that the legislation did not  address, and we are not as safe as we could be from another financial  panic. The problem is not the  traditional type of bank runs your grandparents might have told you  about. Rather, modern bank runs occur in the shadow banking system. The  shadow banking system includes major investment banks, money market  mutual funds such as Fidelity, Vanguard and Schwab, and securities  dealers such as those that can be found at JP Morgan, Bank of America  and Citigroup. 
These banks, which control trillions of dollars in assets – money market mutual funds alone were worth $3.8 trillion in 2008  — serve as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders, and hence  function like traditional banks, but they are not subject to the  regulations that exist in the traditional sector to protect against  problems such as bank runs. 
A bank run  within the shadow banking sector was at the heart of the 2008 financial  meltdown that led to one of the worst recessions in U.S. history, and  it’s a problem that could happen again if we don’t take steps to prevent  it. Shadow banks manage 401(k)s, insurance policies, pension funds and  other consumer investments, and problems in this sector can devastate  retirement, education and other investments that consumers rely upon for  security. 
  Why Bank Runs are a Problem in the Shadow Banking Sector 
Bank runs occur when there are real or imagined worries about the ability of a bank to repay its depositors. In the traditional banking sector, deposit insurance solves the bank run problem, but it can create other problems in the process. In particular, deposit insurance gives banks protection on the downside, and hence gives them an incentive to take on too much risk. Because of this, traditional banks are subject to strict regulation to limit the amount of risk they can carry.
Bank runs occur when there are real or imagined worries about the ability of a bank to repay its depositors. In the traditional banking sector, deposit insurance solves the bank run problem, but it can create other problems in the process. In particular, deposit insurance gives banks protection on the downside, and hence gives them an incentive to take on too much risk. Because of this, traditional banks are subject to strict regulation to limit the amount of risk they can carry.
Shadow banks are also vulnerable to bank runs and other problems. The cataclysmic problems at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers  are prime examples of this, but they weren’t subjected to the same  regulation as traditional banks. In fact, these types of banks have  hardly been regulated at all. Why is this? 
Industry  leaders and lobbyists have argued that more regulation would make them  less competitive, and prevent them from delivering returns on  investments. However, the economic argument that market discipline will  force shadow banks to self-regulate has had more influence on policy.  The idea is that monitoring by depositors worried about losses will  prevent the accumulation of excessive risk. And if problems occur  anyway, the monitoring will ensure that the banks hold enough high  quality financial assets in reserve to prevent bank runs, and in any  case the problems will be confined to the few banks causing the trouble.  
But there are three problems with this  argument. First, large shadow banks have an implicit government  guarantee due to their too-big-to-fail status, and this gives them the  incentive to assume too much risk despite the monitoring. 
Second,  an informational market failure created by lack of transparency and  highly complicated financial assets makes it impossible for investors to  monitor the quality of the loans, investments, and the financial assets  held as reserves. Prior to the financial meltdown, investors relied  upon the ratings agencies to do the monitoring for them, but that turned  out to be a mistake. Many of the assets held in the shadow banking  system turned out to be much riskier than their rating suggested, and  when that fact was revealed, a bank run followed. 
Third,  banks were far more interconnected than regulators realized. They held  too few high quality reserves to prevent bank runs, and the problems  were not confined to the financial sector. 



 
 






 
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